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THE SIMPLICITY PATTERN CASE: ROBINSON-PATMAN
CONFOUNDED*
MUCH of the confusion surrounding the Robinson-Patman Act I springs
from the ambiguous contents of its several sections and from the unclear effect
which one section has upon another.2 Poor draftsmanship was perhaps inevit-
able, for the statute was a hastily fashioned compromise between two groups
in Congress,3 both of which desired to protect independent retailers against
chain stores. Because massive buying power and the capacity to perform whole-
saler functions enabled large chain stores to acquire substantial cash and
service discounts from their suppliers, the chains could undersell their smaller
competitors and thus force them out of business.4 One congressional faction
*Simplicity Pattern Co. v. FTC, 258 F.2d 673 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted, 358 U.S.
897 (1958).
1. 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1952).
2. See Automatic Canteen Co. of America v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61, 65 (1953) ("precision
of expression is not an outstanding characteristic of the Robinson-Patman Act");
Ruberoid Co. v. FTC, 189 F.2d 893, 894 (2d Cir. 1951) ; 80 CONG. REC. 9419 (1936) (the
Robinson-Patman bill "contains many inconsistencies, and the courts will have the devil's
own job to unravel the tangle") ; Austern, Dealing With Uncertainties, in How To Com-
PLY WITH THE ANTITRUST LAWS 343, 356 (Van Cise & Dunn ed. 1954) ("After so
many annual symposia on the happy ambiguities of the Robinson-Patman Act, it would
be arrogant even to attempt to catalogue the wide valleys of confusion-and the deep
gullies of complete uncertainty."); Rowe, The Evolution of the Robinson-Patman Act:
A Twenty-Year Perspective, 57 CoLum. L. REv. 1059 (1957).
In interpreting the act, courts have often found it necessary to incorporate into one
section provisions found in another. Thus, §§ 2(a), 2(c), and 2(d) require that the
defendant be "engaged in commerce," and that his offense be "in the course of such com-
merce." These requirements were omitted from § 2(e), although they have been subse-
quently read into that section in order to preserve its constitutionality. Elizabeth Arden
Sales Corp. v. Gus Blass Co., 150 F2d 988 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 773 (1945).
Similarly, neither § 2(e) nor its companion, § 2(d), contains a provision equivalent to §
2(a)'s reference to discrimination "between different purchasers of commodities of like
grade and quality." Nonetheless, in a case under § 2(d), the Commission construed the
term "commodities" to mean goods of a like grade and quality. Golf Ball Mfrs. Ass'n, 26
F.T.C. 824, 851 (1938).
On the relationship between sections, see Rowe, Discriminatory Sales of Commodities
in Commerce: Jurisdictional Criteria Under the Robinson-Patman Act, 67 YALE L.J.
1155, 1163, 1166 (1958).
3. Note, 67 YALE L.J. 1073, 1075 n.5 (1958) ; see AUSTIN, PRICE DiscRiSmNATION AMN
RELATED PROBLEMS UNDER THE RoBINSO0N-PATTr.:Ax ACT 5 (rev. ed. 1953) [hereinafter
cited as AUSTIN] ; Oppenheim, Federal Antitrust Legislation: Guideposts to a Revised
National Antitrust Policy, 50 MICH. L. REv. 1139, 1199 (1952) ; Rowe, Price Discrinlina-
tion, Competition and Confusion: Another Look at Robinson-Patman, 60 YALE L.J. 929,
942 (1951) ; note 9 infra.
See also 18 U.S.L. WEEK 3209 (1950) (oral argument of Standard Oil Co. v. FTC,
340 U.S. 231 (1951)).
4. See Generally ZORN & FELDMAN, BUSINESS UNDER THE NEw PRICE LAWS 3-27
(1937).
For further information on the origin and legal impact of the Robinson-Patman Act,
see DRLAm & KAHN, FAIR COmpEnTIoON: THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF ANTITRUST
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sought to arrest this development through an extension of the antitrust laws,
which, while preserving the basic policies of that body of legislation,5 would
close existing loopholes relating to discriminatory discounts. 6 Under this
approach, discounts-whether granted in the form of cash or free services and
facilities-would be prohibited only if they were injurious to competition and
were not justified by the relatively lower cost of servicing a particular pur-
chaser.7 The other faction in Congress favored more thoroughgoing protection
for the small, independent retailer, and would have classified all discounts as
unlawfully discriminatory irrespective of their effect on competition or
whether they could be cost-justified.s
The compromise enacted to accommodate these two views " was written
POLICY 119-34, 202-56 (1954) ; FTC, FINAL REPORT ON THE CHAIN STORE INVESTIGATION
(1934).
The Robinson-Patman Act was largely the result of active lobbying on the part of
,mall business groups and was substantially drafted by the United States Wholesale
Grocers' Association. See PALA-MOUNTAIN, THE POLITICS OF DISTRIBUTION ch. VII
(1955) ; Fulda, Food Distribution in the United States, The Struggle Betweea Inde-
pendents and Chains, 99 U. PA. L. R.v. 1051, 1082-109 (1951).
5. The controlling philosophy of the antitrust laws is the positive value of fair com-
petition. "[Tihe essence of competition is a contest for trade among business rivals in
which some must gain while others lose, to the ultimate benefit of the consuming public."
ATr'y GEN. NAT'L Co-mi. ANTITRUST REP. 164 (1955).
6. These loopholes existed in the original § 2 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 730 (1914).
See ATr'v GEN. NAT'L Comm. ANTITRUST REP. 156 (1955) ; AUSTIN 5-11; FTC, FINAL
REPORT ON THE CHAIN STORE INVESTIGATION (1934) ; Rowe, The Evolution of the Rob-
inson-Patman Act: A Twenty-Year Perspective, 57 CoLumt. L. REV. 1059, 1063-64 (1957).
7. See 80 CoNG. Rc. 9417 (1936) (cost-justification defense assures mass distributor
"full protection in the use and rewards of efficient methods in . . . distribution in return
for depriving him of the right to crush his efficient smaller competitors with the power
and resources of mere size"); ATr'y GEN. NAT'L Co.tm. ANTITRUST REp. 163, 170, 171
(1955) ; AUSTIN 57, 58; Rahl, Antitrust Policy in Distribution, 104 U. PA. L. REv. 185,
211 (1955). See also 80 CONG. REc. 8107-11 (1936) ; H.R. REP. No. 2287, 74th Cong.,
2d Sess., pt. 2, at 5, 6, 26, 27 (1936) (congressmen urging antitrust point of view).
S. See GASKILL, PRICE DIScRiMINATION LAW 19 (1936) ("It is as though the Con-
gress now sees that competition is manifested through competitors and seeks to preserve
the freedom of competition by assuring the existence of competitors.") ; A Symposium on
the Robinson-Patnman Act, 49 Nw. U.L. REV. 196, 197-98 (1954).
Many congressmen feared that large chain stores would entirely eliminate the small
businessman, thus wiping out the greater number of individual competitors. Thus, the
Robinson-Patman bill initially took form as an anti-chain-store statute which would pro-
tect the small independent businessman irrespective of his relative efficiency. See Adelman,
The Consistency of the Robinsd-Patman Act, 6 STAN. L. REV. 3, 23 (1953) (a re-enacted
NRA) ; Morton & Cotton, Robinson-Patman 4ct-Anti-Trust or Anti-Consumer?, 37
MINN. L. REV. 227, 228 (1953) ; Rose, The Right of a Businessman To Lower the Price
of His Goods, 4 VAND. L. REV. 221, 238, 253 (1951). See also remarks of Rep. Patman, 79
CoNG, REc. 9078 (1935).
The original drafts of the act prohibited all price differentials regardless of their
effect on competition or their possible cost justification. S. REP. No. 3154, 74th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1936); H.R. REP. No. 8442, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1936).
9. See Oppenheim, supra note 3, at 1201-02. Compare Note, 67 YALE L.J. 1247-48
(1958).
In its final form, § 2(a) was directed not only at price discriminations which sub-
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in such indefinite terms that the Federal Trade Commission and the courts
were given room to approach the legislation in accordance with either view.
The FTC has chosen not to read Robinson-Patman in pari maateria with the
antitrust laws, of which that statute ("an Act to amend section 2 of the [Clay-
ton] Act") is technically a part,' and has interpreted it instead to grant
maximum protection to the small retailer."' During the first decade of
Robinson-Patman, the courts gave at least tacit approval to this reading. 12
stantially lessen competition but also at discriminatory practices which "injure, destroy or
prevent competition with any person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit
of such discrimination." "The significance of the added words lies in the protection they
afford to individual competitors. Such provision, intended to reach discriminatory prac-
tices resulting in injury to a single individual as well as to competition generally, was one
entirely new to our antitrust legislation." AusTxx 42. No similar passage was included
in §§ 2(d) and 2(e); the record does not reveal whether this omission was deliberate or
a matter of legislative oversight. See notes 86-90 infra and accompanying text.
Another notable compromise concerned the insertion of the § 2(b) proviso dealing
with the defense of meeting competition. After much debate, see 80 CoNG. RExc. 6426-36
(1936), that proviso was finally enacted as a "procedural" defense, see AusN- 91;
ZoRN & FELDMAN, op. cit. supra note 4, at 358. But see Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340
U.S. 231 (1951) (giving the proviso substantive content).
As another concession to antitrust philosophy, provisions for cost justification and
changing market conditions were included in § 2(a) of the Act. "The section contains
two provisos . ..permitting certain price discriminations to be justified even where the
prohibited effect on competition is present . . . . They realize to a limited extent the
economic desirability of permitting price concessions which reflect cost savings created
by efficiencies of operation .... ." AusTix 57.
10. See 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1952).
11. See notes 53-62 infra and accompanying text (cost justification extremely difficult
under FTC standards).
The Commission has consistently denied that competitive injury is a necessary pre-
requisite to a cause of action under §§ 2(c), 2(d), and 2(e). E.g., Webb-Crawford Co.
v. FTC, 109 F.2d 268 (5th Cir. 1940) (§ 2(c)); Great AtI. & Pac. Tea Co. v. FTC,
106 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1939) (same) ; Oliver Bros. v. FTC, 102 F.2d 763 (4th Cir. 1939)
(same) ; Biddle Purchasing Co. v. FTC, 96 F.2d 687 (2d Cir. 1938) (same) ; Corn Prds.
Ref. Co. v. FTC, 144 F.2d 211 (7th Cir. 1944), aff'd, 324 U.S. 726 (1945) (Q 2 (e));
Elizabeth Arden, Inc. v. FTC, 156 F.2d 132 (2d Cir. 1946) (same). Even in § 2(a) cases,
the Commission has contended that the respondent has the burden of disproving that hi,
price differentials caused competitive injury. Samuel H. Moss, Inc. v. FTC, 148 F.2d
378 (2d Cir. 1945). The FTC's position originally rendered all price differentials prima
facie illegal subject only to "justification" by the affirmatively demonstrated absence of
competitive injury. This position might have been modified somewhat as a result of the
Supreme Court's decision in FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37 (1948). In that case,
the Court held that only those differentials which are "sufficient in amount to influence their
resale prices" create a prima facie case of illegality. Id. at 46-47. Even after the Morton
Salt decision, however, the Commission virtually equated any price differential with com-
petitive injury. See, e.g., Adolph Gottscho, Inc., 46 F.T.C. 100 (1949); Krengel Mfg.
Co., 46 F.T.C. 75 (1949); Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 44 F.T.C. 351 (1948).
Until overruled by the Supreme Court, the FTC maintained that the § 2(b) proviso
did not comprise a complete substantive defense, and that it was merely procedural in its
application. Standard Oil Co., 41 F.T.C. 263 (1945), modified, 173 F.2d 210 (7th Cir.
1949), rev'd, 340 U.S. 231 (1951).
12. The courts have been quite hesitant to upset the findings and therefore the re-
quirements of the FTC on the issue of cost justification. Dunn, Section 2(d) and (e), in
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More recently, however, the Supreme Court has favored construing the act
in a manner consistent with the antitrust laws.1 3
Last year, the Court's antitrust construction of the act was extended by
the District of Columbia Circuit in Simplicity Pattern Co. v. FTC.1 4 Sim-
plicity, a seller of dress patterns to large chain stores and small retail fabric
shops, had provided the chains with storage cabinets and monthly catalogues
free of charge, but had required the fabric shops to pay for these same items.
The FTC had found that this discrimination violated section '2(e) of the
Robinson-Patman Act, which prohibits "the furnishing of any services or fa-
cilities ... upon terms not accorded to all purchasers on proportionally equal
terms.", The evidence indicated, however, as the FTC later conceded, that
Simplicity's practices did not "injure . . . competition." 16 Although this
phrase establishes a prerequisite to a finding of illegal price discrimination
under section 2(a),17 the Commission had ruled that, since injury to competi-
tion is not mentioned in section 2 (e), such injury is not an element of unlawful
CCH ROBINSON-PATMAN Aer Svymposiu.m 55, 59 (1946); see note 67 infra. Lower
courts have also supported the Commission in its position that competitive injury is not a
prerequisite to an action brought under §§ 2(c), 2(d), or 2(e). See, e.g., cases cited note
11 supra. The Second Circuit has held that the mere existence of a price differential
is enough to create a prima facie FTC case of competitive injury under § 2(a). Samuel
H. Moss, Inc. v, FTC, supra note 11.
13. In 1948, the Supreme Court modified the iloss doctrine, see note 12 supra, and
held that only those differentials sufficient in amount to influence resale prices create a
prima facie case of competitive injury. FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37 (1948). In
1951, the Court held that the meeting-competition defense provided for in the proviso
of § 2(b) is a complete substantive defense. Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231 (1951).
In 1953, the Court specifically stated: "[There is a] duty to reconcile [interpretations of
the Robinson-Patman Act] with the broader antitrust policies that have been laid down
by Congress." Automatic Canteen Co. of America v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61, 74 (1953).
On occasion, loNer courts have responded to the Supreme Court's antitrust interpre-
tation of the act. Thus, the Seventh Circuit has construed § 2(a) to require "substantial,
not trivial or sporadic, interference with competition to establish violation of its mandate."
Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co. v. FTC, 191 F.2d 786 (7th Cir. 1951), cert. dis-
missed, 344 U.S. 206 (1952). The Seventh Circuit also stressed that a causal connection
between price differentials and competitive injury is essential to a violation. Id. at 790-92.
14. 258 F.2d 673 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted, 358 U.S. 897 (1958), reversing Simplicity
Pattern Co., No. 6221, FTC, March 22, 1957.
15. In its entirety, § 2(e) provides:
That it shall be unlawful for any person to discriminate in favor of one purchaser
against another purchaser or purchasers of a commodity bought for resale, with or
without processing, by contracting to furnish or furnishing, or by contributing
to the furnishing of, any services or, facilities connected with the processing, hand-
ling, sale, or offering for sale of such commodity so purchased upon terms not
accorded to all purchasers on proportionally equal terms.
49 Stat. 1527 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(e) (1952).
16. Simplicity Pattern Co., No. 6221, FTC, March 22, 1957.
17. Section 2(a) of the act provides:
That it shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of
such commerce, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price between differ-
ent purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality, where either or any of
the purchases involved in such discrimination are in commerce . . . and where
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discrimination in "the furnishing of . . . services or facilities."' The Com-
mission had also rejected Simplicity's cost-justification defense: that the fur-
nishing of catalogues and cabinets to chain stores free of charge was justified
because Simplicity found it cheaper to serve those stores than independent
retailers. 19 Again, the FTC had reasoned that, while section 2(a) expressly
authorizes cost-justification defenses with respect to price discrimination, sec-
tion 2(e) does not provide for similar defenses in connection with "services
or facilities" discrimination. 20
On appeal, the District of Columbia Circuit upheld the FTC's determination
that injury to competition was irrelevant, but reversed the Commission's de-
cision that cost-justification defenses were unavailable. Relying on previous
cases, the court declared section 2(e) a "per se statute, requiring no proof
of competitive injury"2 -- though a footnote evidenced the conviction of one
judge that "Congress intended.., to prohibit only such discrimination as pro-
duced a competitive injury. '22 Despite its "per se" ruling, a majority of the
court concluded that section 2(e) prohibits only "unjustified" discrimination.
and that the FTC had therefore committed reversible error in denying Sim-
plicity an opportunity to prove that the freely furnished services and facilities
were cost-justified. 23 According to the court, were cost justification estab-
lished, Simplicity would have conclusively rebutted the prima facie case of
unlawful discrimination which was made out when the FTC demonstrated the
unequal treatment of customers.2 4 Hence, the case was remanded.25
the effect of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition or tend
to create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent
competition with any person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of
such discrimination, or with customers of either of them: Provided, That nothing
herein contained shall prevent differentials which make only due allowance for
differences in the cost of manufacture, sale, or delivery resulting from the differing
methods or quantities in which such commodities are to such purchasers sold or
delivered: . . . And provided further, That nothing herein contained shall prevent
persons engaged in selling goods, wares, or merchandise in commerce from
selecting their own customers in bona fide transactions and not in restraint of trade:
And provided further, That nothing herein contained shall prevent price changes
from time to time where in response to changing conditions affecting the market for or
the marketability of the goods concerned ....
40 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1952).
18. Simplicity Pattern Co., No. 6221, FTC, March 22, 1957.
19. See 258 F.2d at 679.
20. See Ibid.
21. Id. at 677-78.
22. Id. at 681 n.13 (footnote to opinion of the court).
23. Id. at 679-83.
24. Ibid.
One judge dissented on this issue, stating that the defenses permitted by the act are
clearly defined and are restricted to "that described in the meeting competition proviso
• . . or such justifications as may be spelled out from the provisions of the particular
section . . . creating the offense alleged." Id. at 683-84. "Simplicity cannot refuse pro-
portional equality and then argue that its refusal is justified by cost differentials-a defense
available under Section 2(a), but not in one brought under Section 2(e)." Id. at 684.
25. Id. at 683.
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Of the appellate court's two holdings, that on cost justification was the more
significant. The conclusion that the cost-justification defense is available under
section 2(e) rested not on prior case law but on a novel reading of sections
2(b) and 2(e). Section 2(b) provides:
Upon proof being made ... that there has been discrimination 1n price
or services or facilities furnished, the burden of rebutting the prima facie
case thus made by showing justification shall be upon the person charged
with a violation .... Provided, however, that nothing herein contained
shall prevent a seller rebutting the prima facie case thus made by showing
that his lower price or the furnishing of services or facilities to any pur-
chaser or purchasers was made in good faith to meet an equally low price
of a competitor, or the services or facilities furnished by a competitor.2 6
Until Simplicity, it had been thought that the principal clause of section 2(b)
was solely a procedural one, and that the "justification" referred to could be
either the meeting-competition defense found in the 2(b) proviso, or any de-
fense contained in the particular section under which an action was brought.27
Thus, in an action under section 2(a), the respondent could attempt to justify
discrimination on the basis of the 2(b) proviso (meeting competition) or on
any other ground, such as cost justification, specifically provided for in section
2(a) . 2  A section 2(e) respondent, on the other hand, could raise only the
2(b) meeting-competition defense, since no "justification" is mentioned in
section 2(e).2 9
The Simplicity decision departed from this reasoning. The court indicated
that, because 2(b)'s meeting-competition proviso contains its own procedural
language, the allocation of the burden of proof in 2(b)'s principal clause does
not relate solely to the proviso. The court then observed that, if the principal
clause of section 2(b) is wholly procedural, as traditional interpretation main-
tains, the clause is meaningless in so far as it applies to section 2(e), which sets
forth no separate "justification" defense of its own.30 Yet, the court continued,
26. 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1952).
27. E.g., Automatic Canteen Co..of America v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61, 78 (1953); H.R.
REPs. Nos. 2287, 2951, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936); 80 CONG. R c. 9418 (1936). "Section
2(b) ... did not dispense with any element of the offenses defined in the express prohibi-
tions of the Act; it merely reaffirmed as to administrative proceedings in price discrimination
cabts the evidentiary rules of the common law." AT'r'y GEN. NAT'L Commi. ANTITRUST
REv. 163 (1955). See also 258 F.2d at 684 (dissenting opinion).
28. Ar'sTiN 81 ("it has been uniformly held that the term 'justification' [in § 2(b)]
refers to the exemptions created by the provisos of Section 2(a)"). For the text of §
2(a), see note 17 supra.
29. AUSTIN 142-43. For the text of § 2(e), see note 15 supra.
In the past, the courts have consistently said that the cost-justification defense does
not apply to any section other than 2(a). E.g., Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. FTC, 106
F.2d 667, 675-77 (3d Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 625 (1940) ; Oliver Bros. v. FTC,
102 P.2d 763, 767 (4th Cir. 1939) ; Biddle Purchasing Co. v. FTC, 96 F.2d 687 (2d Cir.
1938).
30. The Simplicity court concluded that the main body of § 2(b), interpreted as a
procedural section, has no application to §§ 2(d) and 2(e). This would appear to be
true in so far as § 2(b) governs the burden of proof with respect to "justifications," but
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2(b)'s principal clause refers to discrimination in. the furnishing of "services
or facilities," and hence must have some application to section 2(e). Noting
that a procedural interpretation of 2(b)'s principal clause adds no content to
2(e), the court concluded that 2(b)'s principal clause must be substantive-
that it -must embody defenses for alleged 2(e) violations, though no specific
"justification" appears in 2 (e) itself.3' Returning to the case before it, the
court held that cost justification is a section 2(b) defense to 2(e) discrimina-
tion. 32 The court said, however, that it was not using 2(a) criteria to define
"justification" in section 2(b), and that, while cost justification was being
allowed, the reason it was being allowed was not because it is one of the 2(a)
defenses.33
Simplicity involved only section 2(e) discrimination, but the court's con-
clusion as to the substantive content of 2(b)'s principal clause appears per-
tinent to section 2(d) as well as 2(e). Section 2(d) prohibits a seller from
paying his customers for "services or facilities" rendered him unless the pay-
ments are granted on "proportionally equal terms" to all customers. 34 Pay-
ments of this sort-like the actual furnishing of services or facilities covered
by 2(e)-are employed by sellers as a method of providing discounts and.
more important, of inducing a customer to increase his volume of sales and,
consequently, his purchases of the seller's product.35 As in the case of 2(e),
no "justification" defense is specified in 2(d). Therefore, if the 2(b) reference
to "services or facilities" embraces 2(e), it must cover 2(d), for, by virtue of
its 2(e) analysis, the court would also have to give 2(b) a substantive inter-
pretation in connection with 2(d)."'
The legislative history of the Robinson-Patman Act indicates, however,
that the court's interpretation of section 2(b) is incorrect. A decision that
section 2(b)'s main clause is substantive assumes that Congress would have
omitted that clause's reference to "services or facilities" unless the clause was
there is another possible application which § 2(b) might have to §§ 2(d) and 2(e). If
Congress intended a lack of proportionality under those latter sections to create only a
prima facie case of competitive injury, see note 89 infra, then it would fall upon the
respondent in §§ 2(d) and 2(e) cases, as it does in § 2(a) cases, see FTC v. Morton
Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37 (1948), to show the lack of any injury to competition. This
situation is one of those covered by the language of the main body of § 2(b). See AUSTIN
86-90.
31. The court did not reason in terms of a substantive or procedural § 2(b), but
clearly reached the result of making 2(b) a substantive provision. Its reasoning is
found at 258 F.2d at 679-83.
32. Id. at 681, 683.
33. For analogous rulings, see cases cited note 29 supra.
34. 49 Stat. 1527 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(d) (1952).
35. Fisher, Sections 2(d) and (e) of the Robinson-Patinan Act: Babel Revisited, 11
VAND. L. RsZv. 453, 459-61 (1958).
36. To distinguish between discounts in the form of services or facilities (§ 2(e))
and discounts in the form of payments for services or facilities (§ 2(d)) would be to
create an illogical inconsistency. Compare 72 HARV. L. REv. 385, 387 (1958). ThV
Simplicity decision would not apply to § 2(c), howeVer, since that section deals with
brokerage fees, and § 2(b) makes no reference to that form of discount.
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intended to govern sections 2(d) and 2(e). The assumption is erroneous.
The congressional reports on Robinson-Patman stated that the principal clause
of section 2(b) would simply serve to place on respondent the burden of
justifying a challenged discrimination, should "justification" defenses be avail-
able to him. 8 True, 2(b)'s principal clause so construed is inapplicable to
sections 2(d) and 2(e) ; but 2(b)'s seeming allusion to 2(d) and 2(e) stems
from an inadvertent drafting error. In the original House bill, the forerunner
of section 2(b) was directed exclusively at section 2(a) and was altogether
meaningful.3 9 In the Senate bill, 2(b) referred to 2(d)'s predecessor as well,
and the latter section contained what could be deemed two "justification" de-
fenses of its own.40  The House-Senate conference committee adopted the
broader Senate version of 2(b) but not the defenses set forth in the Senate's
initial 2(d) ; 2(e) was also added to the final draft, and it was likewise devoid
of defenses. 41 The inconsistency dwelled upon by the Simplicity court arose
here, for, as adopted by the House-Senate committee, section 2(b) retained
37. See 258 F.2d at 681 (making such an assumption).
38. H.R. REP. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1936) ; 80 CONG. REC. 9418 (1936)
(conference committee report).
39. H.R. REP. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936) (the present § 2(b) was desig-
nated § 2(e)).
The House version of the bill also contained sections which were equivalent to the
present §§ 2(d) and 2(e) of the Robinson-Patman Act, but the forerunner to § 2(b)
(§ 2(e)) made no reference to them.
40. In the Senate version of the bill, § 2(b) was added on the floor and referred
to "services or facilities." 80 CoNG. REc. 6426-36 (1936). The Senate bill's section which,
with modifications, eventually became § 2(d) of the Robinson-Patman Act provided:
That it shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce to pay or
contract fur the payment of anything of value to or for the benefit of a customer
of such person in the course of such commerce as compensation or in consider-
ation for any services or facilities furnished by or through such customer in con-
nection with the processing, handling, sale, or offering for sale of any products
or commodities manufactured, sold, or offered for sale by such person, unless-
( 1) such payment or consideration is offered on proportionally equal terms to all
other customers competing in the distribution of such products or commodities;
or unless
(2) the business, identity, or interests of such customer are in no way publicly
associated, by name, reference, allusion, proximity, or otherwise, with or in the
furnishing of such services or facilities, and the consideration paid therefor does
nut exceed the fair value of such services or facilities in the localities where
furnished.
S. RET'. No. 3154, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1936).
41. 80 CoxG. R.c. 9413 (1936) (conference committee report).
The clause in the Senate version of § 2(d), dealing with proportional equality, see
note 40 supra, was incorporated into the body of that section, see 49 Stat. 1527 (1936),
15 U.S.C. § 13(d) (1952). Under the Senate version, proportional equality was an
affirmative defense which was governed by the procedures of § 2(b). Under the adopted
version, the absence of proportional equality must be shown to establish a cause of action,
and the burden is on the FTC. The second defensive proviso of the Senate version,
see note 40 supra, was completely omitted.
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the Senate language, "services or facilities," but was in fact unrelated to sections
2(d) and 2(e).
The District of Columbia Circuit's misreading of congressional intent places
that tribunal in good company. The Supreme Court, in attempting to inter-
pret the Robinson-Patman Act according to antitrust principles, has occasion-
ally ignored relevant portions of the statute's legislative history,' 2 though
possibly Simplicity has outdone prior cases in this respect. However that may
be, the Simplicity court, though purportedly bound by precedent to declare
section 2(e) a "per se" provision,43 also, apparently, sought to effectuate
antitrust policy-by allowing alleged violators of the section to utilize the cost-
justification defense.44
Whether or not an antitrust approach to the Robinson-Patman Act is com-
mendable, the means used in Simplicity to implement that approach leave much
to be desired. The court's refusal to import section 2(a) criteria into section
2(b) to define "justification" invites needless litigation over the content of
2(b)'s newly discovered substantive defenses. In fact, the court gave no par-
ticular reason for including cost justification within section 2(b) ;45 thus. the
decision sets no standards for future guidance.
On the one hand, the decision's open-ended definition of "justification"
should not be deemed to permit alleged 2(d) and 2(e) violators to raise
defenses from without the Robinson-Patman Act.46 Such an extension of the
Simplicity rationale might render the statute as impotent to prohibit anti-
competitive discrimination as was the original section 2 of the Clayton Act,
which Robinson-Patman was designed to tighten.47 On the other band, if the
antitrust approach to Robinson-Patman is to achieve rational expression, all
42. Compare H.R. REP. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1936) and 80 CONG.
REc. 9418 (1936) with Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231 (1951). Compare AUSTIN
149-50 with Automatic Canteen Co. of America v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61 (1953). See also
AusTIN 82-97; Note, 67 HARv. L. Ray. 294 (1953).
43. See 258 F.2d at 678 n.6.
44. Cost justification recognizes the economic desirability of permitting price con-
cessions which are true reflections of efficiency. It is designed to permit the more efficient
buyer to realize the fruits of his efficiency which may in turn be passed on to the ultimate
consumer. Thus, cost justification is based on the basic philosophy of antitrust law. See
ATT'Y GEN. NAT'L COm3f. ANTITRUST REP. 170, 171 (1955) ; AUSTIN 57-58; Fuchs, The
Requirement of Exactness in the Justification of Price and Service Differentials Under
the Robinson-Patinan Act, 30 TEXAS L. REv. 1, 4 (1951).
The act's only limitation on the use of cost justification is directly tied to antitrust
policy. The second proviso of § 2(a) reads:
Provided, however, That the Federal Trade Commission may . . . fix and establish
quantity limits, and revise the same as it finds necessary, . . . where it finds that
available purchasers in greater quantities are so few as to render differentials
on account thereof unjustly discriminatory or promotive of monopoly in any
line of commerce ....
49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1952).
45. The court merely stated: "That the term [justification] may include a 'cost
justification' which Simplicity desired to establish seems clear enough." 258 F.2d at 081.
46. Compare Note, 67 YALE L.J. 1073, 1080-82 & n.23 (1958).
47. See authorities cited note 6 supra.
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section 2(a) defenses, and not merely cost justification, should be read into
section 2(b) .48 For example, a manufacturer wishing to dispose of goods made
obsolete by changed market conditions should be allowed to donate services
or facilities in order to help retailers move the goods, and should not be
compelled to furnish proportionally equal services or facilities to those re-
tailers who previously purchased the same merchandise when it was more
marketable. 49 Such a "change-in-market justification" seems as relevant
under sections 2(d) and 2(e) as it is under section 2(a), since service or
facility discounts are essentially indirect price discounts.r ° In sum, both to
impart a degree of certainty upon which the businessman can rely and to
implement a consistent antitrust design, the Simplicity court, once it fastened
upon the "justification" provision of section 2(b), should have found that
provision to comprehend all of-but only-the section 2(a) "justification"
defenses.
Another problem which the Simplicity decision leaves unanswered is how
cost justification applies to section 2(e) (and (d)) cases. In the context
of services or facilities, this defense raises difficulties not present in section
2(a) cash-discount situations. Assume, for example, that it costs a manu-
facturer $10,000 less to service buyer A than to service A's competing buyers,
and that the manufacturer therefore desires to supply A with an equalizing
amount of facilities free of charge. If cost to the manufacturer is taken as the
basis for determining the quantity which may be so furnished, buyer A may
receive a benefit which is worth more than $10,000 to him. The manufacturer
-normally a large-scale supplier rather than a limited user of the facilities in
question-will probably be able to obtain them at a lower price per unit then
that at which his customers could purchase them from an independent source.
If the cost to the hypothetical manufacturer is assumed to be half the cost to
his buyers, buyer A, on receiving free facilities which cost the manufacturer
$10,000, gains an advantage of $20,000 over any competing buyer who must
purchase the same facilities.
To avoid this anticompetitive result, a court should calculate in either of
two ways the amount of facilities which the cost-justification doctrine per-
mits the manufacturer to furnish A free. The first way is to estimate the
cost of the facilities to buyer A and to allow him no more than $10,000 of
free facilities so computed.' Alternatively and preferably, the courts could
48. The defenses available under § 2(a) are cost justification, change of market
conditions, and refusal to deal. See note 17 supra.
49. Under § 2(a), a manufacturer may give cash discounts on obsolete goods. See
Aus--iN 77-78; OPPENHEIM, PRICE AND SERVICE DiscRI iNoATIxs UNDER THE ROBIN-
SON-PATMAN ACT 28 (1949) ; ZoRN & FELDMAN op. cit. supra note 4, at 119-23.
50. Discriminatory payments for, and the furnishing of, services or facilities may
often amount to indirect price discriminations within the meaning of § 2(a). See ATr'v
GEN. NAT'L Co 0zti. ANTITRUST REP. 191-92 (1955); AusTIN 118; Fisher, Sections 2(d)
and (e) of the Robinson-Patinan Act: Babel Revisited, 11 VAND. L. REv. 453, 457-58
(1958).
51. If the facility in question would cost buyer A $50 per unit and he has saved
the manufacturer $10,000, he will receive 200 units. If, on the other hand, the facility
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let the manufacturer use his own cost as the basis for determining the amount
of free facilities to be supplied A, provided the manufacturer makes the same
facilities available at that cost (plus cost of distribution) to all his other cus-
tomers. Of course, if buyers need a service or facility to merchandise a product
on hand and the service or facility is offered only by the seller of the product,
as in the case of dress-pattern catalogues, the latter procedure should be
mandatory.5 2
Simplicity's gravest weakness lies outside the decision and beyond the prob-
lem of determining the basis for section 2(d) and 2(e) cost-justification cal-
culations. As a practical matter, to arm 2(d) and 2(e) respondents with the
defense of cost justification is neither to help them significantly nor to advance
the use of antitrust criteria in applying the Robinson-Patman Act. Establishing
cost justification is so difficult under the present FTC and judicial requirements
that, in the twenty-two years since the act was passed, only twenty-two cost
justifications have been attempted; of these, fifteen were wholly unsuccess-
ful and two more were rejected in part.53 As a basic requirement, the respon-
would cost a rival buyer B $75 per unit and he has saved the manufacturer $7500, he
will receive only 100 units. Thus, this system of calculation will preserve the same
competitive relationship between the buyers as does a cash discount. It will, however,
raise the difficult if not impossible problem of accurately estimating what the particular
facility would cost each individual buyer if purchased from a party other than the
grantor.
52. Refusal to supply items essential to the sale of goods on hand may constitute
an unfair trade practice in violation of § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 38
Stat. 717 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1952), if the seller's intention to make such a refusal
is not stated in advance of the original sale, cf. 2 TRADE REG. REP. 1 5061 (1954) (col-
lecting cases on the failure to fill orders as an unfair trade practice) ; L. Heller & Son
v. FTC, 191 F.2d 954 (7th Cir. 1951) (failure to disclose material fact which might
affect buyer's desire for the product violates § 5).
If, however, the seller notifies the buyer of his intention not to furnish essential cata-
logues in advance of the sale, the seller's action would, in effect, constitute a refusal to
sell. Such action would probably not violate the antitrust laws. See 49 Stat. 1526 (1936),
15 U.S.C. § 13 (a) (1952); United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
53. The FTC has validated cost justifications in their entirety in Hamburg Bros.,
Inc., No. 6721, FTC, May 16, 1958; Sylvania Elec. Prods., Inc., 51 F.T.C. 282 (1954) :
B. F. Goodrich Co., 50 F.T.C. 622 (1954) : Horlicks Corp., 47 F.T.C. 169 (1950) ; and
Bird & Son, Inc., 25 F.T.C. 548 (1937). The cost justification defense was partly
successful in United States Rubber Co., 46 F.T.C. 998 (1950), and Minneapolis-Honey-
well Regulator Co., 44 F.T.C. 351 (1948). Attempted cost justifications have been
wholly disapproved in Metropolitan Automotive Wholesalers Coop. Inc., No. 5724, FTC,
Aug. 22, 1958 (initial order); Border-Aiklen Auto Supply Co., No. 5766, FTC, Aug. 4,
1958 (initial order) ; D & N Auto Parts Co., No. 5767, FTC, Aug. 4, 1958 (initial order) :
Thompson Prods., Inc., No. 5872, FTC, April 22, 1958 (initial order) ; Fruitvale Canning
Co., No. 5989, FTC, July 1, 1956; C. E. Niehoff & Co., 51 F.T.C. 1114 (1955): Cham-
pion Spark Plug Co., 50 F.T.C. 30 (1953) ; International Salt Co., 49 F.T.C. 138 (1952) :
Curtiss Candy Co., 44 F.T.C. 237 (1947) ; Standard Oil Co., 41 F.T.C. 263 (1945) ; Morton
Salt Co., 39 F.T.C. 35 (1944); E. B. Muller & Co., 33 F.T.C. 24 (1941): Standard Brands,
Inc., 29 F.T.C. 121 (1939) ; Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co., 87 F. Supp. 985
(S.D. Fla. 1949), aff'd, 187 F.2d 919 (5th Cir. 1951) ; and Russellville Canning Co. v.
American Can Co., 87 F. Supp. 484 (W.D. Ark, 1949), rev'd on other grounds, 191 F2d
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dent must present a study derived from the historical costs of specific transac-
tions with the individual buyer who is receiving a discriminatorily favorable
discount. 4 A cost study of this sort necessitates intricate allocations of general
overhead expenditures and computations of direct selling, servicing, and manu-
facturing costs.5 Since this information usually cannot be gathered with the
accounting methods generally employed by businessmen, 6 a specialized and
expensive accounting system is required.57 And, even if a businessman can
afford such a system, he has no assurance that his cost studies will be found to
38 (8th Cir. 1951). For a discussion and analysis of these cases, see TAGOART, CosT
JUSTIFICATION (1959).
This list may not be truly indicative of the importance of the cost-justification proviso,
since it does not take into consideration the multitude of cases in which complaints were
dismissed without order. No published material is available concerning the reasons for
such dismissals. It can be assumed, however, that the cost-justification defense did not
play an important part in the dismissals. Edwards, Cost Justification and the Federal
Trade Commission, 1 ANTITRUST BuTt- 563, 565-66 (1956) ; see Rowe, Price Differentials
and Product Differentiation: The Issues Under the Robinson-Patinan Act, 66 YA.LE L.J.
1, 23 n.101 (1956).
One factor which should be considered is that most of the litigated cost justifications
have re.sted on formulas devised and data assembled after the discounts in question bad
been challenged by the FTC. Massel, The Robinson-Patinan Act: Cost Justification, in
CONFERENCE ON THE ANTITRUST LAWS AND TE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COmmITTEE REPORT
197, 200-01 (1955) ; Rowe, Price Differentials and Product Differentiation: The Issues
Under the Robinson-Patinan Act, 66 YALE LJ. 1, 42-43 (1956) ; Comment, 49 Nw. U.L.
Rnv. 237, 249 (1954). Nevertheless, most authorities agree that it is almost impossible to
establish a cost justification, and that the cost-justification defense has proved largely
illusory in practice. ATT"' GEN. NAT'L Comm. ANTITRUST REP. 171; Edwards, s-pra at
566-71. But see Note, 65 HARv. L. REv. 1011 (1952).
54. Automatic Canteen Co. of America v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61, 68 (1953); Standard
Uil Co., 41 F.T.C. 263, 280-81 (1945) ; Comment, 35 11. L. REV. 60, 71 (1940) ; Note, 65
HAzy. L. REv. 1011, 1012 (1952).
55. Sawyer, Accdunting and Statistical Proof in Price Discrimination Cases, 36 IOWA
L. REV. 244, 249 (1951) ; Fuchs, The Requirement of Exactness in the Justification of Price
and Service Differentials Under the Robinson-Patian Act, 30 TEXAS L. REv. 1, 11 (1951);
Comment, 49 Nw. U.L. REv. 237, 239 (1941).
"Joint costs such as institutional advertising and charitable contributions are allowable
only on a per unit basis, thus precluding the possibility of justifying a differential ...
Indirect costs are difficult to allocate where the producer manufacturers [sic] two or
more products." Note, 67 Yale L.J. 1246, 1248-49 n.8 (1958).
For an outline of cost-accounting problems encountered in developing proof of cost
savings and a discussion of accounting procedure, see FTC, Case Studies in Distribution
Cost Accounting for Manufacturing and Wholesaling, H.R. Doc. No. 287, 77th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1941) ; Heckert, Back to Distribution Costs, 79 J. ACcOUNTANcy 456 (1945).
56. See Automatic Canteen Co. of America v. FTC 346 U.S. 61, 68-69 (1953);
Sawyer, supra note 55, at 247; Comment, 35 ILL. L. Rzv. 60, 61 (1940); Edwards,
supra note 53.
57. Adelman, Price Discrimination as Treated in the Attorney General's Report,
104 U. PA. L. REv. 222, 235 (1955) ; Adelman, The Consistency of the Robinson-Patnan
let, 6 STAN. L. REv. 3, 9 (1953) ; Rowe, Price Discrimination, Competition and Confusion:
.hother Look at Robinson-Patnan, 60 YALE L.J. 929, 965 n.230 (1951); Commuc.t, 49
Nw. U.L. RE%. 237, 248 (1954). But see AvsTIx 60-61 (necessary accounting work
oi dinarily not prohibitively expensive) ; Note, 65 HARV. L. REv. 1011, 1023 (1952) (type
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justify a given discount.5s Respondent bears the burden of proof,59 and the
tendency has been to apply exacting standards to his proof.60 Thus, allocations
of indirect cost may be rejected because they were derived from conventional
data, like sales dollars or cost of goods sold, rather than from a time study. 1
In fact, a cost-justification defense is so unlikely to succeed that the Supreme
Court has gone out of its way to comment that "proof of a cost justification
being what it is, too often no one can ascertain whether a price is cost justified. '0 2
Although the FTC has indicated that it will accept cost studies which are
"made in good faith and in accordance with sound accounting principles," 3
of analysis required by FTC is fairly well defined and probably accords with best account-
ing techniques).
58. Automatic Canteen Co. of America v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61, 68 (1953); ATr'v
GEN. NAT'L Comm. ANTITRUST REP. 173 (1955).
The core of the problem lies in the fact that the FTC refuses to make public a set
of workable criteria on the basis of which the businessman can guide his conduct and
prepare his defense. Even in those cases in which a cost-justification defense has been
accepted, the Commission has not clearly stated on what basis the defense -vas found
to be sufficient. The Minneapolis-Honeywell cost defense succeeded in part because the
Commission found the cost study was "made in good faith and in accordance with sound
accounting principles." Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 44 F.T.C. 351, 380-82,
394 (1948), rezvd on other grounds, 191 F.2d 786 (7th Cir. 1951). But the elements
of good faith and sound accounting principles which the FTC evidently relied upon
were never disclosed. Apparently, the Commission intends to treat each case on its own
facts and to evaluate and judge each cost study independently without recourse to prece-
dent or past findings. See Taggart, Work of the Cost-Justification Committee, 1 ANTI-
TRUST BULL. 585, 586 (1956) ; ATT'v GEN. NAT'L Coamm. ANTITRUST REP. 171, 172 (1955) ;
Oppenheim, Federal Antitrust Legislation: Guideposts to a Revised National Antitrust
Policy, 50 MICH. L. REv. 1139, 1203 n.169 (1952); Rowe, Price Discrimination, Com-
petition and Confusion: Another Look at Rdbinson-Patman, 60 YALE L.J. 929, 962 (1951).
But see Note, 65 HARV. L. REv. 1011, 1023 (1952) (FTC requirements fairly well
defined).
59. FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 44-45 (1948) ; Adelman, The Consistency
of the Robinson-Patuan Act, 6 STAN. L. REi. 3, 9 (1953); Sawyer, supra note 55,
at 245-46.
60. The Commission has not only demanded a highly specialized and expensive
time study as part of the defendant's burden of proof, but has disallowed studies found
to be inacccurate by only a small percentage. E.g., Standard Brands, Inc., 29 F.T.C.
121 (1939); Adelman, The Consistency of the Robinson-Patnan Act, 6 STAN. L. REv.
3, 9-13 (1953) (collecting and discussing cases). The Commission recently recognized,
however, that "there is inherent in [cost studies] a reasonable margin of error." Minne-
apolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 44 F.T.C. 351, 394 (1948); see B. F. Goodrich Co.,
50 F.T.C. 622 (1954); United States Rubber Co., 46 F.T.C. 998 (1950).
61. See FTC, Case Studies in Distribution Cost Accounting for Manufacturinq and
lWholesaling, H.R. Doc. No. 287, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 91-92, 106 (1941).
62. Automatic Canteen Co. of America v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61, 79 (1953); see also
id. at 69; AT'ry GEN. NAT'L Comm. AN'asRT REP. 175 (1955) ; Rowe, Price Differentials
and Product Differentiation: The Issues Under the Robinson-Patinan Act, 66 YALE
L.J. 1, 43-45 (1956).
63. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 44 F.T.C. 351, 394 (1948); see B. F.
Goodrich Co., 50 F.T.C. 622 (1954) ; Address by Edward Howrey, Chairman, FTC, in
N.Y. Times, Oct. 19, 1954, p. 37, col. 1.
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it will continue to view detailed, historical cost studies as prerequisites to cost
justification.04 Moreover, the courts of appeals have shown no desire to depart
from their past deference to FTC determinations on the issue of cost justifica-
tion.0 c Conceivably, the Supreme Court, pursuing its recent antitrust approach
to the Robinson-Patman Act, might revise the FTC's criteria. 6 In the past,
however, alleged violators have been hesitant to press an appeal challenging an
adverse factual ruling on the adequacy of a cost study. 7 Hence, some time may
elapse before the Supreme Court has an opportunity to rule directly upon this
issue. The immediate effect of the Simplicity court's holding that cost justifica-
tion applies to section 2(e) will, therefore, be limited.
The goal of applying the Robinson-Patman Act as an antitrust statute can be
achieved more effectively-and without straining the language of section 2 (b)-
through a refined construction of sections 2 (d) and 2(e). Those sections per-
mit service or facility discounts provided the discounts are made available on
"proportionally equal terms." Courts could employ this test to serve the same
functions under sections 2(d) and 2(e) that cost justification serves under
2(a).
In conformity with congressional intent, 8 the FTC has indicated that it will
give broad scope to the standard of proportional equality.69 Presently, the Com-
mission only requires that a seller apportion service or facility discounts among
buyers in accordance with criteria which are "both honest in ... purpose and
reasonable in ... application.170 The FTC has held that a plan of apportion-
64. See Taggart, Work of the Cost-Justification Committee, 1 ANTITRUST BULL.
585, 586 (1956); ADVISORY CoMMIx. ON COST JUSTIFIcATION, REPORT TO THE FEDERAL
TRADE CommissioN (1956). This committee also advised against specific FTC standards
for establishing cost-justified discounts. See note 58 supra.
65. See authorities cited note 12 supra. See also note 67 infra.
66. See note 13 supra.
67. Although cases generally involving cost justification have reached the Supreme
Court, e.g., FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37 (1948), no case has been carried to
that Court on the issue of the proper accounting techniques and standards to be used in
establishing cost justification. Each adjudication of these techniques and standards is essen-
tially a finding of fact. See Russellville Canning Co. v. American Can Co., 87 F. Supp.
484, 499 (W.D. Ark. 1949); cf. M1inneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co. v. FTC, 191 F.2d
786, 789-91 (7th Cir. 1951). It seems unlikely, therefore, that the Supreme Court will have
a chance to rule on them. See Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 Stat. 717 (1914), 15
U.S.C. § 45 (1952) ; 4 DAvis, ADMINISTRATIvE LAW § 29.01 (1958). Should the Court do
so, it might find the FTC's requirements unreasonable. See generally ibid.
68. See H.R. REP. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936); S. REP. No. 1502, 74th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1936) ; ZORN & FELDMAN op. cit. supra note 4, at 365.
69. Lever Bros. Co., Procter & Gamble Co., Colgate-Palmolive-Peet Co., Nos. 5585,
5586, 6687, FTC, Dec. 16, 1953; see ATr'Y GEN. NAT'1- Comm. ANTITRUST REP. 189-91
(1955) ; Gooder, The Robinson-Patman Act: Section 2(c), (d) and (e), in CoN7ERENcE
ON THE ANTITRUST LAWS AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMAMITTEE REPORT 221 (1955).
70. Lever Bros. Co., No. 5585, at 7, FTC, Dec. 16, 1953; see ATT'v GEN. NAT'L
Co .ANTITRUST REP. 191 (1955).
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ment may be based on the dollar volume of individual buyers' purchases ;71
also, a plan based on the size of individual orders would probably be accept-
able.72 Whenever cost savings in serving customers correspond to one or both
of these figures, service or facility discounts furnished under an acceptable
apportionment plan will approximate discounts based on cost savings. 7-
Should cost differences in the servicing of customers not be proportionate
to differences in the size or volume of their respective purchases, 74 the distribu-
tion of (payments for) services or facilities could be geared to the actual cost
of servicing those customers. The furtherance of antitrust objectives would
be assured by the fact that, under present case law, the benefits of this method
of distribution may not be limited to a small percentage of a seller's customers.75
Cost-justified service or facility discounts would have to be given all customers
who deserve them, not just those purchasers large enough to insist upon them.
Thus, under a typical plan, were it to cost five dollars per unit to serve the
most-difficult-to-supply customer, other customers, while paying the same
price, would receive a discount in the form of (payment for) services or facili-
ties commensurate in amount with the difference between five dollars and the
actual cost of servicing them.7 In addition, under existing decisions a seller
may offer a number of alternative services or facilities so that each customer
can choose those which best suit his individual needs.77
Besides furnishing a substitute for the defense of cost justification, a plan
for distributing service or facility discounts on the basis of sellers' cost savings
would eliminate the procedural infeasibility of that defense. In a section 2(d)
71. Lever Bros. Co., Procter & Gamble Co., Colgate-Palmolive-Peet Co., Nos.
5585, 5586, 6687, FTC, Dec. 16, 1953; Awv'y GEx. NAT'L COmm. ANTITRUST REP. 189
(1955).
72. See AUSTIN 132, 133, 137, 141; Layton, Demonstrators on Proportionally Equal
Terms, in CCH RoBINSOX-PATMAN Acr SY-mPosIum 38, 44 (1948).
73. On the frequency of this correlation, see Note, 65 HARV. L. REv. 1011, 1020
(1952). See also Comment, 49 Nw. U.L. REv. 237, 244 (1954): Comment, 35 ILL.
L. REv. 60 (1940).
74. Thus, a manufacturer might save only 10 per unit on a volume of 1000 units,
2 per unit on a volume of 5000 units, and 50 per unit on a volume of 10,000 units. In
such a situation, an arithmetic ratio based on total volume of sales would not accurately
reflect cost savings. Further, a straight volume discount ratio cannot take into account
the additional expenses involved in a large order which consists of many small shipments.
A size-of-order ratio, on the other hand, might not attribute due weight to the economies
inherent in total volume. And a plan based on either type of ratio could not take into
account the savings which result from the individual methods and efficiency of a particular
customer.
75. Elizabeth Arden, Inc., 39 F.T.C. 288, 301 (1944); see S. REP. No. 1502, 74th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1936) ; H.R. REP. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936); AUSTIN 135.
76. Since the outer limits of proportional equality are undefined, no indication exist,
as to whether a plan based on the cost of serving individual customers would be accepted.
Since the statute does not state what the distribution must be proportionally equal to, such
a plan would seem to fit within the statutory language.
77. Lever Bros. Co., Procter & Gamble Co., Colgate-Palmolive-Peet Co., Nos. 5585,
5586, 6687, FTC, Dec. 16, 1953; ATr'y GEN. NAT'L CoMms. ANTITRUST REP. 189-90 (1955);
AUSTIN 13j.
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or 2(e) action, the FTC must establish the absence of proportional equality;
and, under Simplicity, respondent must then attempt to prove the nigh im-
possible--cost justification. Reading cost justification into "proportionally
equal" would shift the burden to the FTC: to demonstrate proportional ine-
quality, the Commission would have to show that disputed discounts were not
cost-justified. 8
Arguably, this shift in the burden of proof might hinder th enforcement
of the statute, for the seller is in a far better position than the FTC to assemble
relevant cost-justification information. 79 The FTC could obtain adequate in-
formation, however. Since a showing that a seller had no discount distribution
plan, or no data for implementing a plan, would seem to make out a prima
facie case of proportional inequality,8s the seller would still have to undertake
cost studies from which a plan could be derived. Through the discovery
process, the FTC could easily obtain such studies ;81 it would then have the bur-
den of proving their inadequacy or inaccuracy. Hence, while the FTC probably
would not relax its requirement that cost studies reveal the historical costs of
individual transactions, 2 the businessman would at least be assured that, once a
study is made, it will not be rejected unless the FTC can demonstrate that it is
insufficiently exact to reveal actual cost allocations.
Providing for cost-justified section 2(d) and 2(e) discounts-either through
the proposed construction of the "proportionally equal" clauses in those sec-
tions or through Simplicity's novel view of 2(b)-will not in itself transform
the Robinson-Patman Act into an antitrust statute. From an antitrust view-
point, no need exists to prohibit even unjustified discounts unless they tend
to injure competition. 3 The majority's decision in Simplicity seemingly pre-
ferred an antitrust approach to the act but nevertheless affirmed the FTC's
interpretation of section 2(e) as a "per se statute, requiring no proof of
competitive injury. '8 4
78. Assuming the existence of a plan which incorporates a theoretically valid pro-
portionality based on cost savings, the absence of proportional equality could only be
shown through proof that a specific discount based on an alleged saving was in fact
invalid because the alleged saving was fictitious. Thus, if a plan of distribution calls
for the furnishing of $500 worth of facilities for a saving of $500, the FTC would be
forced to prove that, in a particular case, the seller did not in fact save $500.
79. Compare Automatic Canteen Co. of America v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61 (1953).
80. See Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp. v. Gus Blass Co., 150 F.2d 988, 993, 994 (8th
Cir. 1945); Fisher, Sections 2(d) and (eJ of the Robinson-Patman Act: Babel Revisted,
11 VAND. L. REv. 453, 471 (1958).
81. See 16 C.F.R. §§ 1.31-.42, 3.12-.13, 3.17 (Supp. 1958).
82. See note 64 supra. Having the burden of proof, the FTC would find it difficult
to reject studies based on criteria other than time studies.
83. See ATr'y GEN. NAT'L Comm. ANIraRusT REP. 191-92 (1955); Oppenheim, Shoidd
the Robinson-Patmna Act Be Amended?, in CCH ROBINSON-PATA'AN Acr SymPosiUm
141, 145 (1948); Rowe, Price Discrimination, Competition and Cofusion: Another
Look at Robh:son-Patman, 60 YALE L.J. 929, 960-61 (1951) ; Comment, 49 Nw. U.L. REV.
225, 236-37 (1954).
84. 258 F.2d at 677.
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Neither precedent nor legislative policy dictated this ruling. To support its
view that evidence of injury to competition is not needed in establishing a
section 2(e) cause of action, the court cited two decisions by courts of appeals
and one by the Supreme Court.8 5 Coming as they did from other circuits, the
courts of appeals opinions were not binding. They should have been rejected.
Both relied upon the absence of any language in section 2(e) mentioning injury
to competition.8 6 This omission, when contrasted with section 2(a)'s express
requirement that competitive injury be shown, was taken to mean that Con-
gress considers all discriminatory service and facility discounts as necessarily
injurious to competition and therefore as not calling for proof of injury.8 7
Actually, however, in a statute which has necessitated the judicial interpolation
85. Id. at 678 n.6. The cases were Corn Prods. Ref. Co. v. FTC, 324 U.S. 726 (1945) ;
Elizabeth Arden, Inc. v. FTC, 156 F.2d 132 (2d Cir. 1946); Corn Prods. Ref. Co. v. FTC,
144 F.2d 211 (7th Cir. 1944).
Compare the following decisions not cited in Simplicity: Chicago Sugar Co. v. Ameri-
can Sugar Ref. Co., 176 F.2d 1, 9 (7th Cir. 1949) (§ 2(e) damages suit dismissed absent
proof of "competitive injury") ; National Nut Co. v. Kelling Nut Co., 61 F. Supp. 76, 83
(N.D. Ill. 1945) (similar).
86. Elizabeth Arden, Inc. v. FTC, 156 F.2d 132, 135 (2d Cir. 1946); Corn Prods.
Ref. Co. v. FTC, 144 F.2d 211, 219 (7th Cir. 1944), aff'd, 324 U.S. 726 (1945).
87. The circuit court in Corn Products gave no reason for holding that § 2(e) "does
not require even probability of adverse effect upon competition" other than the absence of
any such requirement within the section. Corn Prods. Ref. Co. v. FTC, 144 F.2d 211, 219
(7th Cir. 1944). The Elizabeth Arden decision cites Corn Products and also relies on cases
involving § 2(c) violations. Elizabeth Arden, Inc. v. FTC, 156 F2d 132, 135 (2d Cir.
1946). In those 2(c) cases, the omission of a standard of competitive injury was equated
with a conclusive congressional presumption that all § 2(c) discounts are injurious to
competition. Southgate Brokerage Co. v. FTC, 150 F.2d 607, 610 (4th Cir. 1945) ; Oliver
Bros. v. FTC, 102 F.2d 763, 767 (4th Cir. 1939) ; Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. FTC, 106
F.2d 667, 675 (3d Cir. 1939). Arguably, in so far as Elizabeth Arden (and Corn Products)
relied on § 2(c) precedents they were wrongly decided. Section 2(c) makes it "unlaw-
ful for any person . . . to pay or grant, or to receive or accept, anything of value as a
commission, brokerage, or other compensation . . . except for services rendered." 49 Stat.
1527 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(c) (1952). Thus, § 2(c) is the only substantive section
which does not deal with the discriminatory treatment of two or more competitors. Since
no question of discrimination exists, and since the offense does not even require the presence
of competitors, competitive injury can have no relevance in a § 2(c) case. Sections 2(d)
and 2(e), on the other hand, specifically refer to discrimination between competitors:
therefore, competitive injury would seem to be relevant. Moreover, the existence of
competition is a prerequisite of §§ 2(d) and 2(e) causes of action. AusTIN 117. This
distinction between § 2(c) and §§ 2(d) and 2(e) is further emphasized by the fact that
the proviso of § 2(b), which refers to §§ 2(d) and 2(e) and thus makes available the
defense of meeting competition iii §§ 2(d) and 2(e) cases, does not refer to § 2(c). Hence,
competition was apparently not intended to be a factor in § 2(c) cases.
Moreover, courts have consistently stressed the fact that § 2(a) requirements are not
to be read into § 2(c) cases. See the Southgate, Oliver and Great At!. & Pac. cases,
supra. In contrast, § 2(e) decisions have read two § 2 (a) criteria other than competitive
injury into § 2(e). Elizabeth Arden, Inc. v. FTC, supra ("engaged in com-
merce" and "in the course of such commerce") ; Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp. v. Gus
Blass Co., 150 P.2d 988 (8th Cir. 1945) (same) ; Sun Cosmetic Shoppe, Inc. v. Elizabeth
Arden Sales Corp., 178 F.2d 150 (2d Cir. 1949) (same); Golf Ball Mfrs. Ass'n, 26 F.T.C.
824, 851 (1938) (commodities of "like grade and quality").
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of critical provisions, 8 the absence of a specific 2(e) reference to competitive
injury proves little. The legislative history is inconclusive and indicates, if
anything, that a discriminatory 2(e) discount does not carry with it a con-
clusive presumption that it injures competition.8 9 (In fact, one member of the
majority in Simplicity felt that the case's ruling on the per se nature of section
2(e) was contrary to legislative intent.) °° As for the Supreme Court decision
relied on in Simplicit3-Corn Products Refining Co. v. FTC-it merely stated
that various arguments, including the absence of competitive injury, were "un-
necessary to discuss."' 1 Moreover, if the Supreme Court there approved a
per se construction of section 2(e), Corn Products is inconsistent with the
Court's later recognition, in Automatic Canteen Co. v. FTC, of a "duty to
reconcile [interpretations of the Robinson-Patman Act] with the broader anti-
trust policies that have been laid down by Congress. '92
In contrast with this statement, Simplicity's adoption of a per se interpreta-
tion of section 2(e) fails to effectuate antitrust policies, for inquiry into whether
service or facility discounts adversely affect competition is precluded. Section
2(a), on the other hand, forbids only those discriminatory price discounts
which tend to injure competition or eliminate competitors. 93 Section 2(d) and
2(e) discounts-granted in the form of services or facilities, or payments
therefor---do not necessarily have a greater effect on competition or com-
petitors than price discounts governed by section 2(a). 94 In fact, the indirect
price discrimination which section 2(a) proscribes is little different, if not
indistinguishable, from 2(d) and 2(e) discrimination. 95 The requirement of
proof of injury to competition in one instance and not in the other creates an un-
justifiable inconsistency. If the Supreme Court, upon review of Simplicity,
follows its own charge in Automatic Canteen, it will eliminate this inconsist-
ency by finding section 2(a) competitive-injury criteria applicable to sections
2(d) and 2(e). 6
88. See cases cited note 87 supra.
89. Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp v. Gus Blass Co., 150 F.2d 988, 992 (8th Cir. 1945);
See 80 CONG. RC.C 9418 (1936); H.1. REP. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1936).
90. 258 F.2d at 681 n.13.
91. Corn Prods. Ref. Co. v. FTC, 324 U.S. 726, 745 (1945).
92. Automatic Canteen Co. of America v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61, 74 (1953).
93. Section 2(a) is quoted note 17 supra. The section apparently equates practices
which tend to eliminate competitors with practices which tend to injure competition.
See AusTIN 42.
94. AustiN 116-17. See also Oppenheim, Should, the Robinon-Patinan Ac be
Amended?, in CCH ROBImSON-PATMAN AcT SYmPosium 141, 145 (1948); Rowe, How
To Comply Vith Sectionts 2(c)-(fl, in N.Y. S'ATE BAR Ass'N, 1957 ANTITRUST LAW
Symposium, How To COmPLY WXITH ROBiNSON-PATMAN Acr 124, 133-36.
95. See note 50 supra.
96. Were the Supreme Court to adhere to the apparent meaning of its § 2(a) decision
in FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37 (1948), any service or facility discrimination
among competing customers "sufficient in amount to influence their resale prices" would
constitute prima facie evidence of a § 2(d) or § 2(e) violation, see id. at 47.
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